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1. Chris' motion to modify custody and the attorney's fee issue resulting therefrom is 
not an issue in this appeal. 
At pages two through three and pages fifteen through nineteen of the respondent's brief, Chris 
discusses the attorney's fees related to the dismissal of a motion to modify custody filed by Chris. 
However, Chris' motion to modify and the resulting attorney's fees issue are not issues involved 
in this appeal. 
Monica initially appealed to the district court from the trial court's decision on the award of 
attorney's fees on the dismissal of Chris' motion to modify custody. However, Monica did not 
renew her appeal of the attorney's fee issue on this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Thus, 
Chris' argument in the respondent's brief on the attorney's fees issue is irrelevant. 
2. No slanderous statements of Chris were made in the opening brief. 
At page seven of the respondent's brief, Chris states as follows: 
Appellant opines about the motivation behind the Respondent's decision to request 
a dismissal. The argument set forth is neither factual nor based upon any legal 
justification. The opinions of Appellant that Respondent is a bad father and a 
terrible person are incorrect and inappropriate for a brief submitted to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The Court should not consider the slanderous words and 
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Respondent respectfully requests the rebuttal brief contain only arguments that 
have a factual basis in the record or are based upon solid legal arguments. 
Chris does not specify what statements were made that were slanderous about Chris. Regardless, 
nowhere in this case or in the record has Monica referred to Chris as a bad father or a terrible 
person. 
Presumably, Chris objects to the statements made in section two of the opening brief wherein a 
hypothetical scenario is given of the motives of parties in family law cases involving child support. 
The hypothetical scenario explained that parties in child support cases often exchange child 
support for child custody. However, there was no reference to Chris in the hypothetical scenario, 
nor was anything stated that is not supported by the record. The opening brief simply 
acknowledged what happened in this case and what happens in many family law cases involving 
child support. 
The trial court and Chris' counsel both acknowledged the very facts that Chris appears to object 
to now. On February 26, 2013, the trial court stated as follows: 
This case demonstrates exactly the problems that courts have when parties show up 
in agreements where you have pro se litigants who produce numbers which are not 
consistent with child support guidelines. But in this occasion, I have written 
stipulations and agreements and it's clear from this record that Mr. Gamer 
apparently at some point in this negotiation agreed on the custody arrangement that 
was made and Mrs. Gamer agreed to lesser support - accepting lesser support. 
See Transcript Lodged July 3, 2013, of the Motion Hearing on February 26, 2013. 
See also R, Vol. II, p. 204. 
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Both in the Respondent's Brief on Appeal in the district court appeal and at page nine of the 
Respondent's Brief in this appeal, Chris stated that the "mere fact that the Appellant now has 
decided she doesn't like the agreement made at the time of the original decree does not magically 
relieve her of the legal burden of proving a material and substantial change in circumstances." R, 
Vol. II, p. 235. Moreover, Chris' counsel explained in detail to the trial court the terms of the 
parties' agreement. See Transcript Lodged July 3, 2013, of the Motion Hearing on February 26, 
2013. Thus, Chris acknowledges that an agreement was made relating to child support in the 
original judgment of divorce in this action. The parties may disagree as to what the specific terms 
of the agreement were, but an agreement was made nonetheless. 
3. Monica did not fail to assert the public policy argument before the trial court and 
such argument is not waived on this appeal. 
At page seven of the Respondent's Brief, Chris stated that Monica failed to assert the public policy 
argument to the trial court. However, Monica did present the public policy argument to the trial 
court. 
In the Plaintiffs Motion/Objection to Deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Motion in 
the Form of Complaint to Modify Judgment filed on January 23, 2013, Monica argued that the 
"public policy of the State ofldaho is a strong policy as set forth in the above statutes [Idaho Code 
§§ 32-706 & 32-709] and Idaho Child Support Guidelines requiring child support to be fixed and 
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to comply with Child Support Guidelines." R, Vol. II, p. 153. Additionally, at the oral argument 
on Chris' Motion to Dismiss on February 26, 2013, Monica's counsel argued the public policy 
issue. See Transcript Lodged July 3, 2013, of the Motion Hearing on February 26, 2013. Thus, 
Monica argued public policy to the trial court and the public policy argument was properly 
preserved as an issue on appeal to the district court. 
The public policy argument was also presented to the district court. In the Appellant's Reply Brief 
in the appeal to the district court, Monica provided case law and argument on Idaho's public policy 
of disfavoring agreements limiting child support. See R, Vol. II, p. 255-256 & 260. Therefore, 
Monica argued public policy in the appeal to the district court and the public policy argument is 
properly preserved as an issue on this appeal. 
4. The agreement of the parties to limit Chris' child support obligation violates Idaho 
Code § 32-706 (5) and violates public policy. 
Chris cites Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 265 P .3d 502, 151 Idaho 889 (2011 ), 
for the proposition that unambiguous legislation cannot be modified by the asserted purpose of the 
legislation or by public policy. Verska dealt with a conflict between a set of statutes and the 
statement of purpose that accompanied those statutes. The statement of purpose was not enacted 
into law. The court found that the set of statutes were not ambiguous and therefore declined to 
consider the statement of purpose in interpreting the set of statutes. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 6 
In this case, Idaho Code § 32-709 is at issue and that statute is being compared and contrasted with 
Idaho Code§ 32-706 and the Idaho Child Support Guidelines ("Guidelines" hereafter). The issues 
presented in this case are materially different than the issue presented in Verska because there are 
statutes and court rule being interpreted together rather than a set of statutes being interpreted in 
isolation. The interplay between the statutes and court rule are addressed individually below. 
The first item to consider is the interplay between Idaho Code §§ 32-709 & 32-706. Idaho Code § 
32-709 states that the "provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be 
modified ... only upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances." However, 
Idaho Code § 32-709 does not address how to deal with modifying a decree respecting child 
support that was originally entered in violation of Idaho Code § 32-706, which is the statute that 
details the process for setting child suppmi. Idaho Code § 32-706(5) provides as follows: 
The legislature hereby authorizes and encourages the supreme comi of the state of 
Idaho to adopt and to periodically review for modification guidelines that utilize 
and implement the factors set forth in subsections (1) through ( 4) of this section to 
create a uniform procedure for reaching fair and adequate child support 
awards. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award 
which would result from the application of the guidelines is the amount of child 
support to be awarded, unless evidence is presented in a particular case which 
indicates that an application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. If 
the court determines that circumstances exist to permit a departure from the 
guidelines, the judge making the determination shall make a written or specific 
finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or 
inappropriate in the particular case before the court. When adopting guidelines, 
the supreme court shall provide that in a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
children of the party requesting the modification who are born or adopted after the 
entry of the existing order shall not be considered. 
( emphasis added) 
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Idaho Code § 32-706(5) specifically states the procedure to be used when departing from the 
Guidelines, which requires the court to make "a written or specific finding on the record that the 
application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case before the 
court." The question left unanswered is what is the remedy when Idaho Code § 32-706(5) is not 
followed by the parties or by the court? 
In this case, there is no question that the initial child support obligation deviated from the 
Guidelines. However, the trial court that entered the initial child support obligation did not make 
written findings or specific findings on the record that the application of the guidelines would be 
unjust. Therefore, the question of how to address a violation of Idaho Code § 32-706(5) is 
presented. 
The second item to consider is the interplay between Idaho Code § 32-709 and Section 5 of the 
Guidelines, which was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Comi pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-706(5). 
Again, Idaho Code § 32-709 requires a showing of a substantial and material change of 
circumstances before a child support obligation can be modified. However, Section 5 of the 
Guidelines provides as follows: 
Section 5. Modifications. The amount of child support provided for under these 
Guidelines may constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for 
granting a motion for modification for child support obligations. A support order 
may also be modified to provide for health insurance not provided in the support 
order. 
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Section 5 of the Guidelines provides an additional method for modifying child support in that 
Section 5 allows for an analysis of the amount of child support provided for under the Guidelines 
as compared to the amount of child support currently ordered. That comparison can provide the 
substantial and material change of circumstances required for a modification of child support. 
5. Rules of statutory interpretation provide insight on how Idaho Code § 32-709 should 
be interpreted as compared to Idaho Code § 32-706 and Section 5 of the Guidelines. 
Both Chris and the District Court have made Idaho Code § 32-709 the preeminent statute relating 
to modification of child support. In their view, no fact or issue has any bearing on modifying child 
support other than proving a substantial and material change of circumstances. By doing so, Chris 
and the District Court have rendered Idaho Code § 32-706(5) meaningless as it relates to the 
procedure to be used when there is a deviation from the amount of child support suggested by the 
Guidelines. If a child support obligation is set in contravention of Idaho Code § 32-706( 5), it is 
untouchable unless there is a substantial and material change of circumstances. Additionally, 
Section 5 of the Guidelines is also rendered meaningless under Chris and the District Cami's 
conclusion that the provision in Idaho Code § 32-709 requiring a substantial and material change 
of circumstances is the only consideration in modifying child support. 
Idaho Code §§ 32-709 & 32-706(5) can be read and interpreted to preserve meaning for both 
statutes. "It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes should not be construed 
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to render other provisions meaningless." Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 166, 765 P.2d 676 
(1988). Additionally, conflicting statutes pertaining to the same subject are to be construed in 
harmony with each other as much as reasonably possible. Christensen v. West, 92 Idaho 87, 88, 
437 P.2d 359 (1968). 
Idaho Code §§ 32-709 & 32-706(5) can be reasonably construed together by making Idaho Code 
§ 32-706(5) a prerequisite to applying Idaho Code § 32-709-i.e. the requirement of proving a 
substantial and material change of circumstances to modify a child support obligation does not 
apply if the original child support obligation deviated from the amount of support provided in the 
Guidelines and the trial court made no finding or written record of the reason for the deviation. 
Idaho Code § 32-709 and Section 5 of the Guidelines can also be reasonably construed together. 
In 1980, Idaho Code § 32-709 was enacted providing that the provisions of any decree respecting 
maintenance or support may be modified only upon a showing of a "substantial and material 
change of circumstances." 
On February 10, 1993 the Guidelines were adopted and Section 5 provides that the amount of child 
support provided under those guidelines may constitute a "substantial and material change of 
circumstances" for granting a motion for modification of child support obligations. 
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The use of the phrase "substantial and material change in circumstances" in both Idaho Code§ 32-
709 and Section 5 of the Guidelines is strong evidence that the two provisions were intended to 
work together and that Section 5 is remedial of the language in Idaho Code§ 32-709. 
Idaho Code § 32-709 deals with motions to modify child support where there has been no 
"substantial and material change of circumstances." Section 5 of the Guidelines deals with motions 
to modify child support where there has been no "substantial and material change in 
circumstances" but where the child support is "grossly inadequate" when compared to what the 
child support would be when applying the child support guidelines. 
6. The remedial nature of Section 5 of the Guidelines addresses the concern raised by 
the District Court on the finality of judgments. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the District Court placed a high emphasis on the finality of 
judgments and stated as follows: 
Plaintiff argues that the original agreement was void, since it did not comport with 
the guidelines. Here, the agreement on child support was apparently part of the 
comprehensive parenting plan that had been merged into and was part of the court's 
decree. It is the court's decree that makes the issue final, not the mere agreement of 
the parties. There is no showing to suppmi any contention that the judgment and 
decree itself should be declared void or otherwise set aside. 
R, Vol. II, p. 278. 
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It appears that the District Court viewed the judgment in this case as an all-or-nothing 
proposition-i.e. that the judgment would either have to be completely set aside or that the 
judgment will remain in full effect. As explained by the District Court in the Memorandum 
Decision, "the court does have continuing jurisdiction over the matter of child support." R, Vol. 
II, p. 276. Thus, there is no apparent reason why the child support in this case could not be 
addressed without ove1iurning the entire judgment. 
Additionally, as explained above, Section 5 of the Guidelines was enacted after Idaho Code § 32-
709 and thereby should be considered remedial of Idaho Code § 32-709. Section 5 of the 
Guidelines provides an alternate route for modifying child support. However, Section 5 of the 
Guidelines does not require a wholesale overturn of the judgment. Section 5 of the Guidelines 
should be interpreted to allow a modification of child support and to leave the remainder of the 
judgment alone as it relates to property division, custody, etc. 
7. The District Court erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of Monica's motion 
to modify child support. 
The District Comi discussed the trial court's discretion on the dismissal of Monica's motion to 
modify child support and stated as follows: 
In any event, because Section 5 uses the term "may," there is no basis for this court 
to conclude that the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, erred finding that 
the plaintiff had not established a substantial and material change of circumstances. 
See Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) ("When used in a 
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statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the imperative or mandatory 
meaning of 'must' or 'shall"'). 
The District Court seems to determine that the use of the word "may" in Section 5 of the Guidelines 
renders the entire provision discretionary. If Section 5 of the Guidelines is discretionary, then the 
District Court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision. 
The trial court found that Chris' child support obligation is "grossly inadequate." As explained 
above, the District Court suggests that the trial court had the discretion to apply Section 5 of the 
Guidelines to correct the child support obligation, but did not. The District Court's reasoning 
appears to be that since the trial court had discretion to apply or to not apply Section 5, then the 
trial court did not commit error by not applying Section 5 to fix the grossly inadequate child 
support. 
The trial court's recognition of an injustice in the form of the grossly inadequate child support 
required the trial court to apply any available remedies to correct that injustice under Idaho's 
Constitution. Article I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution provides as follows: 
Justice to be freely and speedily administered. - Courts of justice shall be open 
to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property 
or character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, 
or prejudice. 
Thus, Idaho's Constitution entitles Monica to a remedy, if available, for the grossly inadequate 
child support. When the trial court failed to exercise his discretion in applying Section 5 of the 
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Guidelines, the trial court committed error and the District Court committed error by affirming the 
trial court. 
8. Chris' child support obligation is grossly inadequate. 
In the Respondent's Brief, Chris argued that his additional contributions to the children should be 
taken into consideration on the issue of child suppo1i. Chris argues at page nine of the 
Respondent's Brief as follows: 
In this case, the Respondent contributed directly to the children's needs. The decree 
requires Respondent to assist in paying for clothing, food, school supplies and 
extracurricular activities. Those are the types of items that child support would 
normally cover. That the parties simply chose a more direct path for supplying these 
items to the children justified a deviation from the child support guidelines. 
Thus, Chris believes that his extra contributions to the children's expenses justifies the deviation 
from the amount of support suggested in the Guidelines. However, Chris never provides financial 
figures to support his conclusion that his extra contributions to the children's expenses justifies the 
deviation from the Guidelines. The burden of proof should be on Chris to support his argument 
and conclusion. 
The parenting plan attached to the Judgment entered on October 26, 2010, provides several 
categories of expenses to be split by Monica and Chris. The Parenting Plan apportions costs as 
follows: 
• Chris and Monica will both pay $600.00 per year for school clothes for the children; 
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• Chris and Monica will contribute $30.00 per month for school lunches for the children; 
• In even years Monica will purchase school supplies and in odd years Chris will purchase 
school supplies; and 
• Other school costs such as class fees, yearbooks, and activity cards will be split equally 
between Monica and Chris. 
See R, Vol. I, p. 57. 
Chris' total yearly expenditures under the parenting plan are approximately $1100.00, which is 
comprised of the following: $600.00 for clothes; approximately $300.00 for school lunches 
($30.00 per month for ten months of school); an estimate of $100.00 for school supplies (since the 
parties alternate years, this estimate is actually $200.00 every other year); and an estimate of 
$100.00 to split class fees, yearbooks and activity cards. By dividing the $1100.00 approximate 
yearly total by twelve months, Chris' monthly expenses under the parenting plan are 
approximately $91.67. Therefore, Chris' total monthly obligation to support his children is 
$141.67 ($50.00 monthly child support+ $91.67 in monthly expenses under the parenting plan). 
As previously explained in Monica's opening brief, Chris' child support should be set at $720.08 
per month according to the Guidelines (the $720.08 figure does not account for the tax exemption). 
After accounting for Chris' additional expenses under the parenting plan, Chris is still paying 
$578.41 less per month than he should be paying. Thus, Chris' argument that his additional 
expenses under the parenting plan justify the deviation from the Guidelines is not supported. 
Moreover, the trial court considered Chris' additional expenses under the parenting plan and still 
found that his child support obligation was grossly inadequate. The trial court found as follows: 
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Within that divorce stipulation, the defendant -- excuse me, the plaintiffs motion 
points out that the order was for a very low amount of child support and in addition 
to that within that stipulation, there were some other provisions which you don't 
normally find in decrees but happen from time to time. Specifically that the parties 
would share the costs of school lunch, for example, half each, school supplies, 
extracurricular activity and there was a clothing provision within that decree that 
provided for I believe up to 600 a year. 
Ms. Garner has filed an action asking the Court to modify this based on child 
supp01i calculations and demonstrating as a bootstrap argument that the application 
of all of the standards with these income numbers would show that the child support 
is adequately -- or an inadequate number. It's grossly inadequate. 
See Transcript Lodged July 3, 2013, of the Motion Hearing on February 26, 2013 
at 8-9. 
Thus, the trial court was well aware of the extra expenses paid by Chris and the trial court still 
found that Chris' child suppo1i is grossly inadequate. Since Chris' child support is still grossly 
inadequate after accounting for the additional expenses in the parenting plan, those expenses 
cannot support a deviation from the Guidelines as argued by Chris. 
9. The children would benefit from additional child support. 
As a final attempt to justify the deviation from the Guidelines, Chris argues at page nine of the 
Respondent's Brief that "[t]he Appellant failed to make any showing at the hearing that the 
children's needs were no longer adequately met." This argument is troublesome for several 
reasons. 
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First, Chris' argument fails to recognize that Monica's motion to modify child support was 
dismissed without a trial or any opportunity for Monica to provide evidence to the trial court. Chris 
filed a motion to dismiss Monica's motion to modify child support before Chris filed an answer. 
Thus, the case never got far enough along for Monica to provide evidence to the trial court on 
whether the children's needs were being adequately met. 
Second, even if this case had made it to trial, Monica was not required to prove that the children's 
needs were not being adequately met. A motion to modify child support does not depend on 
whether children's needs are being adequately met. 
Third, it is entirely unreasonable to argue that a motion to modify child support should tum on 
whether the children's needs are being adequately met. For instance, if one parent was wealthy 
and could provide everything the children needed, then under Chris' theory the other parent would 
not need to pay child support because the children's needs were already being adequately met. 
Idaho law and public policy have long held that both parents owe a duty of support to their children. 
That duty does not disappear if one parent is able to adequately provide for the children. 
The fact that the children would have been better provided for if Chris paid child support in 
accordance with the Guidelines seems undisputable. In fact, there are objective facts that the 
appellate court can take judicial notice of in considering Chris' statement that Monica provided no 
proof that the children's needs were not being adequately met. 
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Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 20l(f), "[j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding." More specifically, judicial notice "may be taken at any stage in the proceeding, at the 
trial or appellate level." Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 340, 775 P.2d 651 (Ct.App.1989). The 
only limitation on the use of judicial notice by the appellate court is that a "judicially noticed fact 
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by reso1i 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Idaho R. Evid. 20l(b). 
In this case, Monica asks the appellate court to take judicial notice of her bankruptcy. Monica's 
bankruptcy is capable of accurate and ready determination by resmi to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. Bankruptcy records are public records. Thus, the appellate court 
can easily verify the information provided below regarding Monica's bankruptcy. 
On July 12, 2013, Monica filed for bankruptcy. Chris had notice of this bankruptcy because he 
was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy. Of note in the bankruptcy schedules is that Monica 
owned a 1994 Ford Explorer that was in poor condition and that Monica did not own any real 
property. Thus, Monica was renting a house for her and the children to live in and Monica was 
driving the children around in a vehicle that was older and in poor condition. 
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Chris made the statement in the Respondent's Brief that Monica "failed to make any showing at 
the hearing that the children's needs were no longer adequately met." The insinuation of that 
statement is that the children's needs were being adequately met and that additional child support 
is unnecessary. Chris knew Monica was experiencing financial difficulties because he had notice 
of the bankruptcy as a creditor. There is little doubt that the children would have benefited had 
Chris been paying the Guideline child suppoti amount. 
The child support lost by Monica and saved by Chris is substantial. On November 7, 2012, Monica 
filed her motion to modify child support. Thus, child support could have been modified beginning 
on December of 2012. 
Twenty-three months have elapsed since December of 2012. As explained above, even after 
accounting for Chris' current child support and the additional expenses he pays for the children, 
Chris pays $578.41 less per month than he should under the Guidelines. Since December 1, 2012, 
Monica has lost and Chris has saved $13,303.43 in child suppoti (23 months x $578.41 = 
$13,303.43). The children surely would have benefited from that lost child support over the last 
twenty-three months. 
10. Conclusion. 
As far as is known to counsel, there is no case law in Idaho or in other states that directly addresses 
the issues raised in this case. This is a matter of first impression in Idaho and likely many other 
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states. This is also a matter of great importance and a matter that is frequently an issue in custody 
and child support cases. 
This case really boils down to the interpretation ofldaho Code §§ 32-706 & 32-709 and Section 5 
of the Guidelines. Chris and the District Court interpret Idaho Code § 32-709 in a way that gives 
no meaning to Section 5 of the Guidelines and that also eliminates the requirements ofldaho Code 
§ 32-706(5) when deviating from the child support amount recommended by the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines were adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court on February 10, 1993, and amended by 
the Idaho Supreme Court some twenty times with no changes being made to Section 5. If the Idaho 
Supreme Court intended for Section 5 to have no meaning, as argued by Chris and the District 
Court, then the Idaho Supreme Court would likely have taken Section 5 out of the Guidelines. 
On the other hand, Monica provides an interpretation that allows Idaho Code § § 32-706 & 32-709 
and Section 5 of the Guidelines to work in harmony together. Moreover, Monica's interpretation 
supports and enforces Idaho's public policy that parents have a duty to support their children. 
Regardless of all of the arguments made by Chris and the District Court, there is no question that 
the children in this case would be better off with more financial support from their father Chris. 
The current child support amount is grossly inadequate and adversely affects the children on a day-
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to-day basis. Idaho law and equity must intervene to provide a remedy to correct the grossly 
inadequate child support in this case and to do what is in the best interests of the children. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Ryan 
Counsel for the Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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